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Liability Incurred by a Receiver or Trustee
In Bankruptcy Conducting a Business
By AUGUST B. ROTmScH D*
IN AN ordinary' bankruptcy proceeding, at the first meeting of cred-
itors, a trustee in bankruptcy is elected or appointed. His duty is to col-
lect, preserve and liquidate the assets of the estate and distribute them
to creditors. 2 The court may, under special circumstances, authorize
the trustee to conduct and operate a bankrupt's business.3 Normally
the court will do so only when the trustee believes that a higher price
could be received for the assets by selling the business as a going con-
cern, or when work in progress can be completed at a substantial
profit to the estate-particularly where completion of the work will
avoid substantial claims for damages for breach of contract.
A receiver, although not appointed in every bankruptcy case, may
be appointed to preserve and protect the assets of the debtor in invol-
untary bankruptcy proceedings pending a determination whether there
will be an adjudication in bankruptcy or a dismissal. A receiver may
likewise be appointed to protect and preserve the assets from the date
of adjudication to the election of a trustee in bankruptcy.4
* J. D., University of California, 1928; member, National Bankruptcy Conference;
Lecturer in Law, University of San Francisco, 1938-1941, 1946; member, California Bar.
I As distinguished from a debtor proceeding under chapters IX-XIII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
2 Bankruptcy Act §47(a)(1), 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §75(a)(1) (1958);
1 COLLIER, BANimuPTcY 229 (14th ed. 1962).
3 Under Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(5), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(5)
(1958), courts of bankruptcy have the power to "Authorize the business of bankrupts
to be conducted for limited periods by receivers, the marshals, or trustees, if necessary
in the best interests of the estates .... " In re Wiener, 7 F. Supp. 691 (1932), states that
this "extraordinary" power is limited to "exceptional cases." See also 2 Crxa, REcEnvEms
674 (3d ed. 1959).
4 Under Bankruptcy Act §2(a)(3), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(3)
(1958), bankruptcy courts have the power to "appoint, upon the application of parties
in interest, receivers or the marshals to take charge of the property of bankrupts and to
protect the interests of creditors after the filing of the petition and until it is dismissed
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Normally a receiver appointed after adjudication will be author-
ized to conduct and operate the business only when a trustee would
be authorized to do so. However, a receiver appointed prior to adjudi-
cation will in many cases be authorized to conduct and operate the
enterprise to protect the alleged bankrupt from loss of his business
in the event there is no adjudication in bankruptcy and the petition
is dismissed.
Proceedings under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act normally
contemplate that the debtor will seek either to obtain an extension of
time to pay his creditors or to make a composition with his creditors.
It is the practice in some districts to leave the debtor in possession
pending approval of his plan of arrangement, whereas in other dis-
tricts a receiver is always appointed. Because Chapter XI proceedings
seek rehabilitation rather than liquidation of the debtor, the receiver
under Chapter XI will normally be directed to conduct and operate
the business.5
When a Chapter XI proceeding is filed in a pending bankruptcy
proceeding after the election of a trustee, the trustee continues in
office," but acts in the same manner as if he were a receiver appointed
in the Chapter XI proceedings.7
In proceedings under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act (cor-
porate reorganizations) and in the relatively rare proceedings under
Chapter XII (real estate reorganizations by individuals), the trustee,
if appointed, normally conducts the debtor's business. In corporate
reorganizations under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, the object
is to "preserve, if possible, the going-concern values of the debtor in
contrast to the forced sales and depressed values of outright liquida-
or the trustee is qualified." See also General Order 40, Bankruptcy Act (as amended,
Jan. 16, 1939): "A receiver or marshal appointed by the court to take charge of the
property of a bankrupt after the filing of a petition, shall be deemed to be a mere custo-
dian within the meaning of section 48 of the Act, unless his duties and compensation are
specifically enlarged by order of the court, upon proper cause shown, either at the time
of the appointment or later."
5 Bankruptcy Act § 343, 52 Stat. 909 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1958): "The
receiver or trustee, or the debtor in possession, shall have the power, upon authorization
by and subject to the control of the court, to operate the business and manage the
property of the debtor during such period, limited or indefinite, as the court may from
time to time fix, and during such operation or management shall file reports thereof
with the court at such intervals as the court may designate." As in ordinary bankruptcy,
however, the receiver in chapter XI is not empowered to continue the business without
express authority to do so. 8 Coumaz, BAsRup cy 984-85 (14th ed. 1962).
a Bankruptcy Act § 332, 52 Stat. 908 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1958): "The court
may, upon the application of any party in interest, appoint, if necessary, a receiver of
the property of the debtor, or, if a trustee in bankruptcy has previously been appointed,
shall continue such trustee in possession."
7Bankruptcy Act § 343, quoted at note 5 supra.
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tion."8 Accordingly, section 189 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that
"A trustee or debtor in possession, upon authorization by the judge,
shall operate the business and manage the property of the debtor
during such period, limited or indefinite, as the judge may from time
to time fix." Without such authorization, however, a Chapter X trustee
has only the normal powers of a bankruptcy trustee.9
Liability of a Receiver or Trustee in General
A receiver in bankruptcy, trustee in bankruptcy, or a trustee in
reorganization has no inherent authority to conduct and operate the
business of the bankrupt or debtor. He must be authorized to do so
by the court appointing him.
Under the common law, a receiver has the duty of exercising reason-
able care in the conduct of the fiduciary estate unless relieved of that
duty by an order of the court or a particular statute. The same rules
apply in bankruptcy proceedings. 10 Therefore, a receiver or trustee
authorized to operate a business should secure from the court orders
specifically directing him to do any acts in which a question might
later arise as to whether reasonable judgment had been exercised.
While a trustee or receiver is personally liable for any negligence
or wrongful handling of the estate he is not an insurer of the successful
management of the debtor's business and personal liability will not
ordinarily be imposed on him for mere mistakes in judgment where
reasonable care or diligence has been exercised. 1 Where the fiduciary
negligently handles the bankrupt estate, however, his account may be
surcharged for any loss resulting to the estate.
12
Once he has embarked on the course of continuing a business the
trustee or receiver may have to decide whether circumstances require
that it be discontinued and liquidated. This is of particular importance
when he discovers that the business cannot be operated at a profit.
Usually a business that has come under the jurisdiction of the bank-
8 6 CoLmn, BANmmuprcy 2445 (14th ed. 1962).
9 Bankruptcy Act § 187, 52 Stat. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 587 (1958).
10 United States ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445 (1938), in which a
trustee in bankruptcy was held personally liable for depositing funds of the estate in
an approved banking depositary which he knew to be unsafe.
" 6 COLLmR, BANERVPTCY 2458-59 (14th ed. 1962). See also 2 CLAnx, &cErvim
656 (3d ed. 1938).
M2 United States ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445 (1938); Carson, Pirie,
Scott & Co. v. Turner, 61 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1932). It has been held that the fiduciary's
duty of care to the estate may include insuring it against loss, thus subjecting him to
personal liability to the estate for failure to do so. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Crow, 83
F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1936). See also In re P-R Holding Corp, 84 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1949), where a trustee was surcharged for authorizing non-customary painting of a hotel.
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ruptcy court has a record of losses, and its continuance can frequently
be expected to result in further losses to the estate. Losses may be
justified where the conduct of the business will result in a higher price
for the assets or a reduction in claims for breach of contract. If the
business is being conducted for other reasons,' 3 the fiduciary risks
personal liability if, as soon as he reasonably determines that losses
are being sustained, he fails to inform the court and give it the oppor-
tunity to determine the plausibility of continuing the business.
In an equity receivership, a district court held the receiver to be
under a duty to inform the court immediately and subjected him to
a surcharge for losses sustained after the date when he should have
sought the court's advice.14 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, however, has held a trustee in bankruptcy not chargeable for
losses where he operated the business for six months while looking for
a purchaser,' 5 stating "the general rule is that receivers are not charge-
able with losses resulting from operation of a business, although it is
their duty to exercise diligence in selecting competent employees and
informing themselves as to profits and losses from such operation."",
The court further stated that the degree of diligence is a question of
fact for the court to determine, and therefore one court may refuse to
surcharge a trustee for what another court has in the past found to
be a negligent act.
The Bankruptcy Act specifically requires a trustee in reorganization
in a Chapter X proceeding to file reports on the business with the court
"at such intervals as the court may designate."17 There is no such re-
quirement in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings, but a prudent trustee
or receiver will keep the court advised of any changes in the business,
and he will also keep the creditors' committee advised, if one has been
formed.' 8
23 E.g., to realize prospective profits from a current contract.
4 In re Consumer's Coffee Co., 162 Fed. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1908), where the receiver
was held liable for losses sustained after he should have known that the restaurant busi-
ness could not be operated at a profit; he did not report the losses to the court, nor did
he keep adequate records. See also United States ex rel. Merchants & Mfrs. Sec. Co. v.
Johnson, 98 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1938); Wire Wheel Corp. v. Fayette Bank & Trust Co.,
30 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1928) (dictum).
5 In re Breger Kosher Sausage Co., 129 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1942).
'old. at 64.
-7 Bankruptcy Act § 189, 52 Stat. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 589 (1958).
s A debtor in possession has the responsibility of a receiver or trustee. 6 Cor.r.r,
BAqmxupTcy 2438 (14th ed. 1962); In re Avorn Dress Co., 78 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1935).
It would therefore be interesting to speculate whether a debtor in possession would incur
post-bankruptcy liability for continuing a business after he had knowledge that it could
not be operated profitably.
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At the outset a trustee or receiver appointed after adjudication is
under no duty to run the business rather than liquidate it unless he is
directed by the court to do so. It has even been held that he is under
no duty to request such authority where it would appear beneficial
to the estate.19 A receiver might incur liability pending adjudication
if he terminates a profitable business and a dismissal of the proceed-
ings rather than an adjudication in bankruptcy results.
Liability on Contract
A receiver or trustee running a business must often enter into con-
tracts. The most common are contracts for the purchase of goods on
credit, the borrowing of money, and agreements involving sales.
A trustee or receiver upon authorization of the court may borrow
money to run the business and issue certificates of indebtedness or
pledge assets of the estate as security.2 0 The power to continue the
business does not in itself imply the power to place liens upon the
assets of the estate as security for the loans.2' It has been held that
where a court authorized a trustee to borrow a specified amount of
money he could not claim implied power to borrow more.2 2 In an
equity receivership, it was held that where there was specific and
limited authority to borrow money, the purchasing of goods on credit
is equivalent to borrowing and is impliedly forbidden if the limit for
borrowing is passed.
2 3
While it has been stated that the power to borrow money is not
implied in an order authorizing the continuance of the business in
ordinary bankruptcy cases2 4 and even in corporate reorganizations, 25
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a debtor in
possession, having the same powers and rights as a trustee, had the
implied power to purchase a limited amount of goods on credit and
even to borrow money to pay for the goods.
26
19 In re Wiener, 7 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1932).
20 See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 233 (14th ed. 1962) (ordinary bankruptcy); 6
CoLLm, op. cit. supra at 717-21 (corporate reorganizations); Bankruptcy Act § 116(2),
52 Stat. 885 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 516(2) (1958).
21 In re Avorn Dress Co., 78 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1935); see also In re Lerner, 41 F.
Supp. 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
22 In re C. M. Burkhalter & Co., 182 Fed. 353 (S.D. Ala. 1910).
23 Haines v. Buckeye Wheel Co., 224 Fed. 289 (6th Cir. 1915).
24 1 CoLLmR, BANRuPTcY 231 (14th ed. 1962). Childs v. Empire Trust Co., 54
F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1932).
25 11 IEmiNGTON, BANKRUPTcY 212 (5th ed. 1961). See also In re Avorn Dress Co.,
78 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1935); Standard Capital Corp. v. Saper, 115 F.2d 383 (2d Cir.
1940); in both cases there had been limited, explicit authority to borrow.
2
0 In re J. C. Groendyke Co., 131 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1942).
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In at least one case where the trustee lacked express authority to
borrow money, the court stated that the repayment of a loan would
be allowed as a matter of equity and as an expense of administration.
It appeared that the loan would have been authorized upon timely
application and the creditors had not been injured by the continuance
of the business which the loan made possible. The trustee believed
that he had authority and the court found that this was an element of
good faith.
7
The implication of authority to borrow limited funds or to purchase
goods on credit, where reasonably required under the circumstances,
is consistent with the duty of the fiduciary to carry on the business in
the ordinary way.28 However, to be safe, the receiver or trustee should
apply for express authority from the court to borrow money.
One loaning money to a bankrupt estate should see that the order
of the court authorizes the loan. One dealing with a bankrupt estate
deals "at his peril" as to the authority of the trustee or receiver. Such
statements have been relied upon in denying the creditor the right to
recover from the estate. 29 Although there are cases permitting recovery
against a receiver individually where he borrowed money or purchased
goods on credit without authority of the court,30 it would seem that the
2 7 In re American Cooler Co., 125 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1942); see also Northern Fin.
Co. v. Bymes, 5 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1925).28 In re J. C. Groendyke Co., 131 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1942); see also Holeman v.
Natural Soda Prods. Co., 96 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1938).
29 "All persons dealing with receivers do so at their peril, and are bound to take
notice of their incapacity to conclude a binding contract without the sanction of
the court." [Quoting Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Central R.R., 35 N.J. Eq. 426
(1882) ] "Although, as receiver, he may enter into negotiations and make such
agreements as would be binding upon him as an individual, yet, in order to
affect the fund in his hands his acts must be ratified by the court. This rule is
so well established that it has been decided that all persons contracting with a
receiver are chargeable with knowledge of his inability to contract, and enter
into contracts with him at their own peril, and that the court has unquestioned
power to modify or even vacate his agreements." [Quoting BEACH, REcErvERs
§257 (1905)]
Chicago Deposit Vault Co. v. McNulta, 153 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1894).
The lender acts at his peril in accepting such [receiver's] certificates; he must
examine the debtor's-or receiver's-authority and satisfy himself of its suffi-
ciency.
Standard Capital Corp. v. Saper, 115 F.2d 383, 384 (2d Cir. 1940).
[A] debtor continued in possession by court order is in a position analogous
to that of a receiver in equity. The appellant concedes that the cases hold that
parties dealing with a receiver act at their peril and courts, as a rule, refuse
to recognize contracts made by a receiver outside the authority conferred upon
him.
In re Avom Dress Co., 79 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1935).
20 Haines v. Buckeye Wheel Co., 224 Fed. 289 (6th Cir. 1915); In re Erie Lumber
Co., 150 Fed. 817 (S.D. Ga. 1906); Noyes v. Gold, 310 IM. App. 1, 34 N.E.2d 1 (1941).
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rule that one deals at his peril with a bankrupt estate should preclude
recovery from the receiver personally, at least where the trustee or
receiver does not intentionally misrepresent his authority.
The English and American courts have differed quite radically in
their theories of receivers' liabilities. Historically, under the English
rule, a receiver was personally liable, in theory, for contractual obliga-
tions incurred in his administration of the estate. He, in turn, would
be indemnified by the estate against all liabilities properly incurred.31
The American courts departed from this rule of personal liability and
termed the receiver "officially liable." 2 The official liability doctrine
was stated by Mr. Justice Brown of the Supreme Court of the United
States:
Actions against the receiver are in law actions against the receivership
or the funds in the hands of the receiver, and his contracts, misfeas-
ances, negligences, and liabilities are official, and not personal, and
judgments against him as receiver are payable only from the funds
in his hands.33
Since the official liability doctrine historically would not cover
actions of the fiduciary beyond his authority, a few cases have applied
the English doctrine of personal liability when a fiduciary acts beyond
his authority.34 These cases should be re-examined in view of their
obvious inconsistency with the rule that one acts at his peril in dealing
with the fiduciary. To hold the fiduciary personally liable when he
acts on behalf of the estate, even though he has no authority to con-
tract, seems unjust where only the estate benefits from the transaction.
Liability in Tort
Much of American law involving receiverships arose from railroad
failures during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The official
liability rule, the same rule as applied in contract cases, was applied
by the courts to protect receivers from liability for the negligent acts
of railroad employees.3 5 Under the American rule, the estate rather
31 Clark, English and American Theories of Receivers" Liabilities, 27 COL M. L.
REv. 679 (1927).
32 Clark, supra note 31, at 684.
33McNulta v. Locbridge, 141 U.S. 327 (1891); see also 2 CLAr , BRcErv 663
(3d ed. 1959).
34 See cases cited supra note 30; see also dicta in In re Kalb & Berger Mfg. Co., 165
Fed. 895 (2d Cir. 1908); In re Polok, 55 F.2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
35 His [the receiver's] relation to the road and its operation was entirely official,
and he had no interest in or control over the earnings, and was removable at
the pleasure of the court. He was powerless to protect himself against the hazard
of the acts of those he was compelled to employ. His position was analogous
to that of a public officer charged with public duties, in the performance of
which he is compelled to act in part by others. It is a great hardship, in such
cases, to impose upon them the hazards and responsibilities which attach to
[Vol. 15
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than the receiver became liable for damages resulting from the torts
of employees in the operation of the business. 6 This rule is applicable
as well to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy proceedingsaT The offi-
cial liability doctrine protects the trustee or receiver from responsibility
for negligent acts of employees. It would seem that the doctrine would
also offer protection from personal liability for other types of torts
committed by employees.
The applicability of the official liability rule becomes more difficult
where the trustee personally commits or directs the commission of the
tort. There would appear to be no question but that his official posi-
tion would not protect him from personal liability for torts of violence.
The real difficulty is in determining whether the estate or the fiduciary
personally is liable for the type of tort innocently committed in the
operation of the business. An example is the innocent conversion by
the fiduciary of the property of another for the benefit of the estate.
A similar problem arises in the case of a trespass. It would appear
that the receiver of a lumber company should not be individually liable
for damages for trespass if he orders the cutting of timber on land
which he had every reason to believe belonged to the estate. In the
only case that has been found holding the receiver personally liable
for damages for trespass, it appeared that the receiver took possession
of a hotel which he knew the debtor had transferred, on the ground
that the transfer was invalid, without first obtaining a judicial decision
of the invalidity of the transfer.a8 In another trespass case, the court
found that the trespass accrued to the benefit of the estate and per-
mitted the injured party to recover from the estate, stating that if a
judgment were rendered against the trustee he would have the right
to be indemnified by the estate.89
individuals acting by agents appointed for their own convenience and profit.
It would be different if the defendant had sought to do by others that which
he was expected and was competent to do in person. But such was not the case.
The employment of agents was a necessity, and expressly directed by the court;
and if in the performance of this part of his duty, he was prudent, and selected
only competent agents, he had discharged his full duty, and ought not to be
held to guarantee the acts of the agents employed.
Cardot v. Barney, 63 N.Y. 281, 286-87 (1875), quoted in 2 CLARP, REcEmvERS 660
(3d ed. 1959).
3 Clark, supra note 31 at 685. MeNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327 (1891).
372 CoLLIm, BArNcuprcy 1754 (14th ed. 1962). Ziegler v. Pitney, 139 F.2d 595
(2d Cir. 1943); 4 CLARK, RECEVaS 1901 (3d ed. 1959): "[T]he liabilities of receivers
in bankruptcy are predicated on the general usages and rules of equity on the subject
rather than on any peculiarities of the bankruptcy acts ......
s8 Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Citizens Trust & Say. Bank, 186 Cal. 689, 200 Pac.
631 (1921).
9 In re Hunter, 151 Fed. 904 (E.D. Pa. 1907), where, in fact, the trespass was a
knowing one.
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There are cases holding a fiduciary personally liable for conver-
sion,40 but there are so many situations where a receiver or trustee
could innocently convert property not for his own use but for the use
of the estate that there appears to be little justification for holding
the fiduciary liable.
The reasoning behind the official liability doctrine, that a trustee
or receiver must be protected from liability for the torts of employees
which he cannot control or avoid, is equally applicable to situations
where the trustee or receiver innocently and reasonably takes posses-
sion of another's property for the estate's benefit.
It is therefore the writer's conclusion that where a non-violent tort
is committed by a receiver or trustee in good faith and for the benefit
of the estate that the estate rather than the receiver or trustee, per-
sonally, should be liable.
Taxes
In conducting a business, trustees or receivers in bankruptcy are
subject to all federal, state and local taxes applicable to the business
to the same extent as if it were being conducted by an individual or
corporation.41 Thus, where the penalty arises during the conduct of
the business by the fiduciary, the estate is responsible for the penalty
assessed by the taxing authority.42 This is in spite of the statutory pro-
hibition against a taxing agency proving a claim in bankruptcy for a
tax penalty.43
In Boteler v. Ingels,44 the court noted that "Whether the trustee
might be personally surcharged because his refusal to pay the fees
subjected the estate to the increased liability of the penalties, is not
presented."45 This statement implies that a trustee would be surcharged
for penalties incurred by failing promptly to pay taxes for which the
estate was liable in operating the business.
Conclusion
It is obvious that all trustees or receivers conducting and operating
a business assume the duty to do a conscientious job. There are certain
40 In re French, 18 F.2d 792 (W.D. Mich. 1927); see also In re Kalb & Berger Mfg.
Co., 165 Fed. 895 (2d Cir. 1908) (dictum); In re Spitzer, 130 Fed. 879 (2d Cir. 1904)
(dictum); In re Polok, 55 F.2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (dictum); Treat v. Wooden, 138
Fed. 934 (D. Mass. 1905).
4128 U.S.C. § 960 (1958); the fiduciary is responsible in his official capacity under
this section. Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57 (1939), affirming Ingels v. Boteler, 100 F.2d
915 (9th Cir. 1938).
42 Boteler v. Ingels, supra note 41.
43 Bankruptcy Act § 57(j), 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1958).
44308 U.S. 57 (1939), supra note 41.
45 Id. at 60 n.6.
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risks of liability. The courts have recognized in the past that in order
to obtain receivers and trustees they must not subject them to liabilities
over which they have no control. Where the fiduciary receives no
benefit and the benefit is to the estate, regardless of whether the benefit
resulted from an unauthorized contract or an unauthorized tort, the
courts should hold the estate liable and not the receiver or trustee
personally.
